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ANTITRUST STATUTES

HISTORY AND IDENTITY OF THE
RELEVANT ANTITRUST STATUTESt
Ricammx

B. McDFsmoTr*

The principal structure of antitrust law in the United

States is erected about seven Acts of Congress adopted over
a period of more than seventy years. These acts are commonly known as the Sherman,1 Wilson-Tariff,2 Clayton,3 Federal

tMaterial has been compiled and presented as a survey of
the principal antecedents of the existing complex of antitrust
laws. It is not meant to synopsize that law. Today, enforcement agencies exhibit marked preoccupation with problems
of business structure; the law most frequently invoked is the
Celler-Kefauver Act which recast the text of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act relating to mergers and similar consolidations.
Research and editorial work necessary to prepare this article for publication, including the footnotes, was done by
Michael C. McClintock and Robert C. Murray, both of whom
are Staff Members of The Tulsa Law Journal.
Excerpts from a brief submitted in the cause of Ben Hur
Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 841 (10th Cir. 1957). For a related
article by the author, see McDermott, The Shift in Antitrust
Objectives, 19th. Oil & Gas Ins. 117-42 (1968).-Eds.
* Partner: Boesche, McDermott & Eskridge, Tulsa, Oklahoma. LL. B., Washburn College, 1929. Admitted to practice
before the Supreme Court of Kansas, of Oklahoma, of the
United States. Fellow, American College of Trial Lawyers;
Member, Attorney General's National Committee To Study
the Antitrust Laws.-Eds.
Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (partially codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964)) [hereinafter cited to U.S.C. unless context requires the statute].
2 Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 570 (partially codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1964)) [hereinafter cited to U.S.C.
unless context requires the statute].
3 Act of October 15, 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (partially codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964)) [hereinafter cited to
U.S.C. unless context requires the statute].
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Trade Commission, 4 Robinson-Patman, including the BorahVan Nuys,6 Miller-Tydings,7 and McGuire Acts.8 There are
other amendatory acts and enactments effecting special exemptions not within the scope of this article.

Tim SHimwa

ACT

The first antitrust law was the Sherman Act." In general,
it prohibited contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade.10 It punished monopolies and attempts to monopolize." It made violation of its
terms a crime,12 authorized injunctive relief against violations at the suit of the government, 13 and provided for treble
damage actions by private suitors injured in consequence of
a prohibited act.14 The Sherman Act consisted of eight sections in the original text, of which seven are reproduced intact as Sections 1 through 7 of Title 15 of the United States
Code. 15 The treble damage section 6 was omitted from the
4 Act

of September 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (partially
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964)) [hereinafter cited to
U.S.C. unless context requires the statute].
5 Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (partially codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964)) [hereinafter
cited to U.S.C. unless context requires the statute].
6 Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (partially codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1964)) [hereinafter cited to U.S.C.
unless context requires the statute].
7 Act of August 17, 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 673 (partially codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964)) [hereinafter cited to U.S.C.
unless context requires the statute].
8 Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631 (partially codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1964)) [hereinafter cited to
U.S.C. unless context requires the statute].
9 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
11 Id. § 2.
10

12

Id. §§ 1-3.

13 Id. § 4.
14

26 Stat. 209, § 7 (1890).

15 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
16 26 Stat. 209, § 7 (1890).
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Code in view of a subsequent and overlapping provision of
the Clayton Act. 17
Conditions in the national economy prompted the passage
of the Sherman Act in 1890. Various segments of commerce
had combined or were combining into colossi amounting to
virtual monopoly with all its attendant evils.' 8 The Act was
specifically aimed at combinations of railroads and at t h e
Standard Oil Trust which had achieved a strangle hold upon
the entire petroleum industry. After hundreds of decisions
interpreting its meaning, the Sherman Act was finally held
to prohibit only "unreasonable" restraints having a substantial and deleterious effect upon competition in interstate trade
as a whole.' 9 In addition, it was held not to relate to specific
acts between individual competitors which, though damaging
to one or the other, were insignificant in the total flow of the
commerce under study.20 This early limited view of the Sher2
man Act has been significantly modified in recent years, '
' 22
and the
although it was the adoption of the "rule of reason
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
18 S. REP. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). See Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, at 50 (1911) [hereinafter referred to as the Standard Oil Case].
19 Standard Oil Case; United States v. American Tobacco Co.
221 U.S. 106 (1911) [hereinafter referred to as the American Tobacco Case], modifying United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri
Frt. Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
20 Standard Oil Case, citing United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); Hopkins v. United States, 171
U.S. 578 (1898); Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604
(1898). See also Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
21 See Adams, The "Rule of Reason": Workable Competition
or Workable Monopoly?, 63 YALE L.J. 348 (1954); Kahn,
A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherman
and Clayton Acts, 63 YALE L.J. 293 (1954). See also Kahn,
Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARv. L. REv. 28 (1953).
22 Standard Oil Case at 59-60; American Tobacco case at 180.

17
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exclusion of cases of "quantitative insignificance"2 3 which led
historically to the enactment of the Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts. The Sherman Act is still a very live and
potent instrument of antitrust policy. Before private remedy
will avail, it is still necessary in order to prove a violation to
show a significant effect of the accused practice or contract
upon and against the free flow of competitive commercial traf24
fic and to show a significant injury to the public interest.
The Sherman Act has been amended by the Miller-Tydings
Act,25 and in the writer's opinion, significantly impaired by it.
THE WILSON-TAEIFF ACT
The Sherman Act was followed very shortly by supplementary provisions contained in the Wilson-Tariff Act. 20 Sections 73 through 77 of this Act 27 are devoted to an extension
of the prohibitions of the Sherman Act to import trade. These
sections of the law deal with antitrust subjects and prohibit
restraints of trade by contract and by combination or conspiracy between persons engaged in importing goods from a
foreign country into the United States. Violation was made a
crime, 28 injunctive relief was authorized at the suit of the government,29 and a treble damage remedy to private suitors was
provided.30 The relevant portions of the Wilson-Tariff Act
Standard Oil Case; United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171
U.S. 505 (1898); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578
(1898); Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604 (1898).
24 Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915);
Shotkin v. Gen. Elec. Co., 171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1948);
Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885 (4th Cir.
1948); Bader v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Ins. Co., 12 F.R.D.
437 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
25 50 Stat. 673 (1937).
26 28 Stat. 570 (1894).
27 Id.
28 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1964).
219Id. § 9.
30 28 Stat. 570, § 77 (1894).
23
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were included in the United States Code as Sections 8 through
11 of Title 15, 31 but the treble damage section was omitted from
the Code for the same reason that the similar section of
Sherman was deleted.
The adoption of the Wilson-Tariff Act reaffirmed t h e
Sherman policy and evidenced a determination to strike down
all barriers to a free and competitive national economy.
THE CLAYTON ACT
In 1911, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
the case of Standard Oil Company v. United States 2 in which
Chief Justice White declared the "rule of reason" referred to
above. The result was to leave the government and private
suitors without practical recourse against incipient practices
which had not yet ripened to the quantitative significance
said to be necessary to invoke the Sherman Act sanctions.
As there were many trade practices which were short of the
consequential magnitude demanded for cognizance under Sherman, Congress adopted the Clayton Act 33 and t h e Federal
Trade Commission Act,34 declaring them to be supplementary
to existing antitrust laws.
The Clayton Act consisted of twenty-six sections of which
only sixteen are reproduced in Title 15 of the United States
Code. Sections 12 through 27 of Title 15 included all portions
of the Clayton Act and were selected by the editor of the
United States Code for inclusion in the antitrust chapter. Section 13 of Title 1535 reflected a revision of Section 2 of the
Clayton Act by the Robinson-Patman Act, and Sections 12a,
13b, and 13c 036 are additions or insertions which were never a
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1964).
32 Standard Oil Case at 59-60.
33 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
34 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
3r 49 Stat. 1526 (1936).
36 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a-c (1964).
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part of Clayton but were derived from the Robinson-Patman
Act and another enactment not relevant to this discussion. The
excluded sections were of a procedural nature, 87 except one
which denounced a specific crime,38 and were classified to
other titles by editorial decision. Such exclusions typify the
extreme editorial liberty exercised in the compilation of the
United States Code.
As was true of the restrictive early decisions under the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act addressed itself to particular
trade abuses thought to have transgressed the substantial restraints and monopolies tests defined in Sherman. Discriminations in price between purchasers in competition with each
other were prohibited "where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a moonpoly".30 Contracts or sales conditioned upon an agreement not to deal in
the goods of a competitor were proscribed. 40 Corporations were
prohibited from acquiring stock of another corporation where
the effect would substantially lessen competition. 41 By the
Cellar-Kefauver Act of December 29, 1950, this provision was
elaborated to prohibit the acquisition of assets in a competing
corporation where the result again "may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly". 42 Interlocking directorates of banks and certain other corporations were
prohibited.43 Purchases by carriers from other entities having
common control were limited.44 Though these particulars are
not the whole subject matter of the Clayton Act, they do illustrate the character of specific abuse to which its terms
were addressed. Sanctions still were limited by the proviso

37

38 Stat. 730, §§ 17-20 & 22-26 (1914).

38 Id. § 21.
39
40

15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
Id. § 14.

41

Id. § 18.

42

64 Stat. 1125 (1950).

43 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1964).
44 Id. § 20.
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that the abuse denounced must "substantially affect" competition in interstate trade or "tend" toward the creation of a

monopoly. Further particularization and amendment by the
Robinson-Patman Act were to be the ultimate result.
Also included in Clayton was a provision allowing a pri-

vate person injured in his business and property by anything
"forbidden in the antitrust laws" to recover threefold his damages in a civil action before the United States Courts. 5 The
words "antitrust laws" as used in this section were defined
in Section 1 of the Clayton Act46 to mean the Sherman Act,
the Wilson-Tariff Act, and the Clayton Act. Section 12 of Title

1547 purported to reflect this definition but it did not do so.
Again, the editorial prerogative was exercised to a shocking
degree. Section 12 said that the words "antitrust laws" meant
all of Sections 1 through 27 of Title 15 of the United States
Code.48 These code sections included more material than was
included in the definition quoted above from the original statute and specificially included Section 13a, 13b, and 13c which
were not enacted until some twenty years later.49 Section 13a
was not within the defined limit of Section 15 of the Code as
it appeared in the original statute, but apparently was within
the edited version of Section 15 which now appears in the
Code in substitution of the original text.
The Clayton Act received strict interpretation at the hands
of the courts and the "quantitative significance" issue became
of increasing concern in the decision of close cases.50 Further,
4
46

47
48

Id. § 15.

38 Stat. 730 (1914).
15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).

Id.

49 15 U.S.C. § 13a-c (1964).
10 Vonnegut Mach. Co. v. Toledo Mach. & Tool Co., 263 F. 192,
at 200 (N.D. Ohio 1920), rev'd on issue of jurisdiction. See
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921); Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering
Co., 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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there was confusion and uncertainty with respect to the interpretation of certain exculpatory provisos attached to the
original Section 2 concerning quantity discounts and the like,5 1
all of which ultimately led to a review and revision of the
price discrimination particulars of the Clayton Act in the
Robinson-Patman law.
Perhaps it should be noted that there were no criminal
sanctions included in the Clayton Act. Enforcement evidently
was intended to be left to the actions of private suitors for
treble damages, 52 to actions for injunction by private suitors
or by the government, 53 and to the Federal Trade Commission
54
which was created at about the same date.
TnE FEDERAL TRADE Co1mXssIoN ACT
Concurrently with the enactment of t h e Clayton Act,
Congress established the Federal Trade Commission.55 The

primary objective of Congress was to establish an administrative body with certain legislative powers to supplement the
sovereign enforcement of the antitrust laws. Particular emphasis was placed on the area of the Clayton Act. However,
the Federal Trade Commission statute also contained important substantive extensions of the antitrust laws and granted
the Commission the legislative authority to define and determine the particulars of its own jurisdiction. 0 The Federal
Trade Commission law, including its many amendments, is
now coded as Chapter 2 of Title 15 of the United States Code,
though its original extent was limited to Sections 41 through
7
58 of Title 15.5
51 38 Stat. 730, § 2 (1914).
52 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
53 Id. § § 25-26.
54 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
56 38 Stat. 719, § 5 (1914).
57 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
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The Federal Trade Commission enactment denounced "unfair methods of competition" as unlawful, though without
further definition. It also delineated administrative procedures
for their prevention and correction. Due to its character as a
legislative body with delegated powers, the Commission then
undertook to define "unfair competition". 58 Its efforts thus
far have largely survived constitutional attack. 59 The Act was
first assumed to apply only to the subject matter of the Clayton Act, but very quickly it was held to contemplate violations of the Sherman and Wilson-Tariff Acts as well.60 Violations of any of the antitrust laws have been held to come
within the purview of "unfair competition" and to be accessible by the Commission and its administrative remedial processes.61 Moreover, the field of unfair competition has been held
to extend beyond the offenses specifically defined in other
antitrust laws. The Commission commonly has invaded the
fields of trademark abuses, 6 2 deceptive advertising,6 an d
similar practices usually thought to adversely affect the free64
dom of competition.
58 1956 F.T.C. ANN. REP. 113-18. But see FTC v. Beech-Nut Co.,
257 U.S. 441 (1921). See also FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421
(1919).
59 Ostler Candy Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1939);
National Candy Co. v. FTC, 104 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1939);
FTC v. McLean & Son, 84 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1936); National
Mfrs. Ass'n. v. FTC, 268 F. 705 (6th Cir. 1920); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
00 FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
61 Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
62 Bakers Franchise Corp. v. FTC, 302 F.2d 258 (3rd Cir. 1962);
FTC v. Real Prods. Corp., 90 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1937);
Fluegelman & Co. v. FTC, 37 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1930).
5r COLUM. L. REV. 1019 (1956). See Union Circulation Co. v.
FTC, 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957); Tractor Training Serv. v.
FTC, 227 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1005
(1956); Prima Prods. v. FTC, 209 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1954).
04

1956 F.T.C. ANN. REP., supra note 58.
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The Federal Trade Commission was authorized to investigate trade practices upon its own motion and to act with or
without independent complaint. 5 Its findings of unfair practices were given effect by orders to offenders to "cease and
desist".66 Compliance with such orders could be exacted by
application to an appropriate United States Court of Appeals
for an order of enforcement. 67 The order of enforcement, when
issued, could then be executed by contempt procedures. 8 The
Act was an important step in the evolution of the antitrust
structure. It expressed the policy determination of government
that competition in commerce should be free of all unreasonable restraint so the public could enjoy the economic benefits
of untrammeled offerings of goods upon the best terms of
price, quality, and service.0 9 The Act has been the subject of
many amendments, including the controversial Cellar-Kefauver Act relating to corporate mergers.70 The activities of the
Commission in this regard have been a vital part of antitrust
enforcement.
THE ROBiNSON-PATmA ACT
and the
BoRH-VAN Nuys ACT
The Act of Congress approved June 19, 1936,71 is commonly called the Robinson-Patman Act, though it actually was
the compound result of consolidation of the Robinson-Patman
65 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1964).
66 Id. § 45 (a)-(c).
67 Id. § 45 (d).
68 Id. § 45 (1).
69 FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923); Florence Mfg.
Co. v. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73 (2d Cir. 1910).
70 15 U.S.C. § § 18, 21 (1964). See Celler, CorporationMergers
and Antitrust Laws, 7 MERCER L. REV. 267 (1956); Handler,
Quantitative Substantiality and the C.eller-Kefauver ActA Look at the Record, 7 MERCER L. REv. 279 (1956).
71 49 Stat. 1526 (1936).
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Bi7 2 with the Borah-Van Nuys Bill 3 by final legislative action
in the United States Senate. The two bills had proceeded independently through the preliminary legislative stages and
were consolidated only at final passage. They were distinctly
different enactments although each dealt with overlapping
subject matter. The original Robinson-Patman Bill was coded
as Section 13 of Title 15 of the United States Code and was
simply an amendment to Section 2 of the Clayton Act. Prohibited discriminations in price were redefined and certain
discriminatory practices were specifically and additionally in74
cluded in its terms.
On the other hand, the Borah-Van Nuys Bill73 was a proposed new criminal law. As noted above, the Clayton Act carried no criminal sanctions. The Borah-Van Nuys Bill designaed some but not all of the Clayton subject matter as crimes.76
It then added certain new offenses not included in Clayton
and also denounced them as crimes. 77 There was no denunciation of sales at "unreasonably low prices" in the Clayton Act
nor in any of the other antitrust laws. Neither were there any
provisions denouncing geographic price discrimination or specifically denouncing advertising allowances. These were entirely new proscriptions in the Borah-Van Nuys Bill.
Enforcement procedures under the Robinson-Patman Act
(including the Borah-Van Nuys Bill) have been subject to
doubt and controversy. Since Section I of the law was a frank
amendment of Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 78 it was held not

76

1st Sess. (1935); H.R. REP. No.
2679, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
S. REP. No. 4171, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
S. REP. No. 4171, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
15 U.S.C. § 13a (1964).

7

Id.

78

38 Stat. 730, § 2 (1914). See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936).

72 S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong.,
73
74
75
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to denounce its subject matter as criminal but to be enforceable only by order of the Federal Trade Commission or by
civil action either public or private under the specific provisions of Clayton.7 9 However, Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act contained its own criminal penalties and was therefore
enforceable by indictment, trial, and sentence at the criminal
bar.80 This section did not purport to amend any law, contained only criminal sanctions, and was not enforceable otherwise than by fine and imprisonment.81 The same rule, together
with others relating to statutory construction, precluded extension of the private treble damage remedies of the Clayton
Act to Section 3.82 Confusion and uncertainty relating both to
the constitutionality and the manner of enforcement of Section 3 was noted in the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws"1 which contained a recommendation for its repeal.
The clause of Section 3 which reads

...

to sell ...

goods

at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.. .,84 has been challenged
upon constitutional grounds and upheld when applied to sales
below cost.8 5 The Court pointed out that not ". . . Every sale
below cost constitutes a violation of § 3. Such sales are not
79

Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).

80 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1964).
81 Wilder Mg. Co. v. Corn
82

8

Prod. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915).
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958);
Safeway Stores v. Vance, 355 U.S. 389 (1958), noted at 42
MARQ. L. REV. 123 (1958), 32 ST. Jomi's L. REV. 300 (1958),
11 Vp m. L. REV. 938 (1958). See S. C. Council of Milk Producers v. Newton, 241 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. S.C. 1965), rev'd,
360 F.2d 414 (1966).
ATT'Y GEN., REP. OF THE NAT'L COivM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1955), summarized in 23 Law Week 2501. See

Wood, Report of the Attorney General's Antitrust Committee Three Years After, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 669 (1958).
84 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1964).
85 United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol5/iss3/3

12

McDermott: History and Identity of the Relevant Antitrust Statutes

19681

ANTITRUST STATUTES

condemned when made in furtherance of a legitimate commercial objective, such as the liquidation of excess, obsolete
or perishable merchandise, or the need to meet a lawful, equally low price of a competitor". 86
THE MLLER-TYDING ACT

The Act approved August 17, 1937,87 known as the MillerTydings Act, was an amendment to Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. In brief, it excepted from the prohibitions of Section 1
(restraints of trade) resale price maintenance contracts, now
popularly and argumentatively referred to as "Fair Trade
Agreements", where the branded or trade-marked commodity
was in free competition with other products of the same
character. The exception was subject to a limiting proviso
prohibiting horizontal price maintenance agreements of any
kind between competing manufacturers, wholesalers, brokers,
and retailers.8 8 In effect, the Miller-Tydings Act was a loophole carved out of the Sherman Act permitting the manufacturer of branded or trade-marked goods to contract f o r
minimum resale prices with his dealers or retailers in order
to protect them from price competition with each other. The
act was defended as permitting the manufacturer to protect
his product against a claimed degradation by resale under its
advertised price. Actually, the law was the result of political
pressures exerted by associations of retailers, none of whom
accepted price competition as a desirable facet of the national
economy. The Miller-Tydings Act seriously weakened t h e
Sherman law. Inconsistency with competitive principles led
the Supreme Court to a narrow construction of its terms in
86
87

88

Id., at 36-37. See also Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d
481 (10th Cir. 1957).
50 Stat. 673 (1964).
Id.; cf. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293,
at 296 (1945), citing United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co.,
321 U.S. 707, at 719-23 (1944).
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Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corporation.9 In
this case, the Court held that the Miller-Tydings proviso exempted only the contracting parties to a Fair Trade Agreement. A provision of Louisiana law purportedly extending the
contracted price limitation to non-signers w h o nonetheless
dealt in the fair trade product was held wholly void as in
contravention of the Sherman law. This decision effectively
narrowed the Miller-Tydings loophole. T h e political forces
which had sponsored its enactment immediately returned to
Congress demanding that the banner of Fair Trade again be
raised. The result was the passage of the McGuire Act in 1952. 00
TRE McGumE ACT

The purpose and effect of the McGuire Act01 was to restore to the fullest extent permitted by state fair trade laws
the intended exemption of the Miller-Tydings Act. Its most
practical consequence was to overrule the Schwegmann decision and permit enforcement of "non-signer" provisions of
many state laws which bound all sellers of fair trade products
to the terms of any single fair trade contract existing between
a manufacturer and seller within the state. The anti-competitive effect of the Miller-Tydings Act and of the McGuire Act
has long been recognized by advocates of the antitrust concept.
The inconsistency of these two Acts with the objectives and
purposes of the antitrust laws was frankly recognized in the
Report of the Attorney General'sNational Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws." Pursuant to this report, the Attorney
General recommended the repeal of both the Miller-Tydings
Act and the McGuire Act.
89 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
90 66 Stat. 631 (1952).
91 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1964).
92

ATT'Y GEN., REP. OF THE NAT'L COi.

TO STUDY THE ANTI-

TRUST LAWS, supra note 83.
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OTmR ACTS

The foregoing do not comprise all the statutes making up
the complex of antitrust law in the United States. There are
numerous other statutes which bear narrow and specific application to trade regulation. Many of them are exemptions
from the provisions of the principal antitrust laws-those
exempting 1 a b o r organizations, agricultural cooperatives,
schools and charitable organizations, enterprises regulated by
the Interstate Commerce Commission and similar regulatory
bodies, and certain maritime rate conferences and other groups
who have been able to generate the political force necessary
to achieve exempted status. Provisions which have antitrust
significance are found in the banking law, in the law relating
to dealings in securities, and in other laws as well. Comment
upon these subjects is not included since they are ancillary
to the basic structure of antitrust policy.
PURPOSE

and POLICY of the

ANTITRUST LAWS

The antitrust laws were dedicated to the purpose of protecting competition in interstate trade. There is no doubt that
the rapid growth of great trusts and corporate monopolies in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century was responsible
for the passage of the Sherman Act. Both the debates of Congress and a myriad of court decisions have pointed to the
evils inherent in concentration of property and enterprises into utilities whose size and attributes free them from the discipline of competition. 3 The trade policy of the United States
differs from that of its European contemporaries in this important respect: It is the only nation today which places reliance upon the free competitive efforts of its citizens for its
economic health. None of its competitors in world markets
regard competition as essential to healthy trade. A comparison of commercial experience in the past sixty years is all
that is needed to justify this competitive policy.
2445-77, 2556-57, 2597-2616, 2639-2730 (1890).
See Standard Oil Case, supra note 18, at 83-106.

93 21 CONG. REC.
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Fundamentally, the objective of all trade regulation is
twofold: The first objective is to protect the public against
enhancement of commodity price and against deterioration in
quality of goods; the second objective is to preserve the vigor
and volume of trade itself and this is best served by keeping
trade freely open to new entrants and by extending prompt
rewards to the innovator. Our political leadership in both
great parties and in the Congress has been devoted to the
principle that untrammeled competition is the best surety of
these objectives. The antitrust laws, as they exist today, are
a reflection of this belief and are even now sometimes referred to as an "article of faith" with respect to our national
economic policy.
Competition has been acknowledged as the prime objective of the antitrust laws in many decisions by the Supreme
Court of the United States. For instance, in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association , the basic purpose
of the statutes was republished and acknowledged as follows:
The purpose was . .. to make of ours, so far as

Congress could under our dual system, a competitive
business economyf 5
In Times-Picayune Publishing Company v. United States,9 e
the same principle was redeclared in a decision which construed the purpose behind antitrust laws:
...Basic to the faith that a free economy best
promotes the public weal is that goods must stand
the cold test of competition; that the public, acting
through the market's impersonal judgment, shall allocate the Nation's resources and thus direct the course
its economic development will take . .

.97

94 322 U.S. 533 (1944).

95 Id., at 559.
96 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
97

Id., at 605.
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In Standard Oil Company v. Federal Trade Commission" the
court made the following declaration:
The heart of our national economic policy long has
been faith in the value of competition. In the Sherman
and Clayton Acts, as well as in the Robinson-Patman
Act, 'Congress was dealing with competition, which
it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to
prevent. (citation) .9
Note here that the Robinson-Patman Act was included in
the statutes which were aimed at protection of competition.
A number of authorities have insisted that the devices of the
Robinson-Patman Act are anti-competitive and that its import
runs counter to the main theme of the preceeding antitrust
acts. 100 But the Supreme Court said no. The Court adopted a
construction contrary to the Standard case and, in fact, said:
... We need not now reconcile, in its entirety, the
economic theory which underlies the Robinson-Patman Act with that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
It is enough to say that Congress did not seek by the
Robinson-Patman Act either to abolish competition or
so radically to curtail it that a seller would have no
substantial right to self-defense against a price raid by
a competitor ....
101
In sum, the foregoing cases announce the requirement
that all of the antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman
Act, be read and interpreted in furtherance of a policy now
become doctrine: Traders shall be free to price goods in response to competitive considerations.

98 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
09 Id., at 248-49.
10 0 Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61
IARv. L. REv. 1289, at 1327-50 (1948); Burns, The Anti-Trust
Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 301 (1937); McAllister, Price Control by
Law in the United States: A Survey, 4 LAw & CoNTE1P.
PROB. 273 (1937).
101 340 U.S. 231, at 249 (1951).
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PRICING Is THE SPECIAL
CONCERN OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS

COMPETITIVE

In Standard Oil Company v. Federal Trade Commission,0 2
the court acknowledged trade consideration to be the prime
ingredient it used to interpret the antitrust laws. In short,
untrammeled competitive offering must fix the price of goods.
This concept lies at the heart of antitrust policy.
It is frequently said that the modern history of the antitrust laws stems from the decision of the Supreme Court in
Standard Oil Company v. United States,103 commonly referred
to as the first Standard Oil decision. In this opinion, Chief
Justice White searched the background of congressional objectives and read into the stiff language of the Sherman Law
what the advocates of competition argued was the real economic and social purpose of the antitrust laws; i.e., a discipline
upon commerce. Discarding the strict historic meanings of the
words "restraint of trade" and "monopolize", the Court found
that Congress meant them to encompass nearly anything that
interfered unreasonably with the free play of competitive
forces. This is plainly stated in the following quotation from
the opinion:
Without going into detail and but very briefly
surveying the whole field, it may be with accuracy
said that the dread of enhancement of prices and of
wrongs which it was thought would flow from the
undue limitation on competitive conditions caused by
contracts or other acts of individuals or corporations,
led, as a matter of public policy, to the prohibition
or treating as illegal all contracts or acts which were
unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions,
either from the nature or character of the contract
or act or where the surrounding cicumstances were
such to justify the conclusion that they had not been
entered into or performed with the legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest and
102
103

340 U.S. 231 (1951).
Standard Oil Case.
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developing trade, but on the contrary were of such
a character as to give to the interference or presumption that they had been entered into or done with
the intent to do wrong to the general public and to
limit the right of individuals, thus restraining the
free flow of commerce and tending to bring about
the evils, such as enhancement of prices, which were
considered to be against public policy . . .104
While other wrongs were mentioned, the Court's preoccupation was with "enhancement of prices" as the chief consequence of anti-competitive conditions. It was obvious that the
hazard foremost in the minds of the Court was the danger
to the public resulting from the power or disposition to immobilize price as an instrument of competition.
In an earlier portion of the same opinion, the Court enumerated the chief evils which gave rise to the repudiation of
monopolies in the English law, as witness:
. . . The evils which led to the public outcry
against monopolies and to the final denial of t h e
power to make them may be thus summarily stated:
1. The power which the monopoly gave to the one
who enjoyed it to fix the price and thereby injure
the public; 2. The power which it engendered of enabling a limitation on production; and, 3. The danger
of deterioration in quality of the monopolized article
which it was deemed was the inevitable resultant of
control over its production an d
the 10
monopolistic
5
sale.
Again, price fixing was the first concern. The evils of production limitation and quality deterioration were merely common
instruments by which enhancement of ultimate price was
achieved.
Many cases followed in which the substance of the quoted
language was repeated. The price to the public remained the
104 Id.,

at 58.

105 Id., at 52.
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most jealously guarded ward of the antitrust laws. As the
decisions multiplied, it became apparent that no contract association or arrangement among traders which tended to enhance or immobilize price could be successfully defended
under the law.106 Thus, price fixing became the first per se violation of the antitrust acts. The "rule of reason" established by
the first Standard Oil case for use in determining and defining
"undue" restraint upon trade was held necessary to invoke
the statute. The rule was soon seized upon in an attempt to
defend fixed prices as "reasonable", but the Court promptly
rejected the attempt. In United States v. Trenton Potteries
Company,10 7 the Court held that price fixing, whatever the
price, was wholly incompatible with the fundamental doctrine
of the antitrust laws, to-wit:
...

But it does not follow that agreement to fix

or maintain prices are reasonable restraints and therefore permitted by the statute, merely because the
prices themselves are reasonable. Reasonableness is
not a concept of definite and unchanging content. Its
meaning necessarily varies in the different fields of
the law, because it is used as a convenient summary
of the dominant considerations which control in the
application of legal doctrines. Our view of what is
a reasonable restraint of commerce is controlled by
106 Kiefer-Steward Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S.
485 (1950); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287
(1948); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947); Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metalic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S.
394 (1947); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S.
173 (1942); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241
(1942); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392 (1927); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247
U.S. 32 (1918); Boston Store v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246
U.S. 8 (1918); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 373 (1911); cf. Gibbons, Price Fixing in Patent
Licenses and the Antitrust Laws, 51 VA. L. REV. 273 (1965).
107273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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the recognized purpose of the Sherman Law itself.
Whether this type of restraint is reasonable or not

must be judged in part at least in the light of its effect on competition, for whatever differences of opinion there may be among economists as to the social
and economic desirability of an unrestrained competitive system, it cannot be doubted that the Sherman

Law and the judicial decisions interpreting it are based upon the assumption that the public interest is best
protected from the evils of monopoly of competition.
(citing cases).
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement,
if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably
exercised or not, involves power to control the market
and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The
reasonable price fixed today may through economic
and business changes become the unreasonable price
of tomorrow. Once established, it may be maintained
unchanged because of the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when
fixed. Agreements which create such potential power
may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable
or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute
inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable
or unreasonable as fixed an d without placing
on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law
the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether
it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic conditions. Moreover, in the absence
of express legislation requiring it, we should hesitate
to adopt a construction making the difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of business relations depend upon so uncertain a test as
whether prices are reasonable-a determination which
can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our economic organization and a choice between rival philosophies . . .1o8
After the Trenton Potteries decision in 1927, price fixing became known as a per se violation of the antitrust laws.
108 Id.,

at 396-98.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1968

21

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 5 [1968], Iss. 3, Art. 3

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5, No. 3

The rule has persisted to this date that inquiry into the
particulars or the substantiality of the arrangement is unnecessary if price fixing or price stabilization by contract or
combination is involved.10 9 Moreover, the per se rule has been
extended far beyond mere contract in combination and is held
to condemn any practice, arrangement, business method or
other circumstantial condition which has the necessary or
probable effect of fixing or immobilizing prices. Without attempting to detail the particular cases which have emerged
from this pattern, certain particulars should be noted; e.g.,
conscious parallel pricing was condemned in the second American Tobacco case" 0 without proof of express concert; conformity to multiple freight basing point practices yielding
identical delivered prices was proscribed in the Cement Institute case;"" and the numerous Trade Association cases have
made clear that even innocuous relations of commercial comity
are suspect where the members apparently arrive at sub-2
stantially identical pricing in their professed competition."
Every thread of antitrust policy delineated by the Supreme
Court makes clear its devotion to free competitive pricing.
The right to make a price, and to make a comparatively low
price, is indeed the principal and primary weapon of competition.
The Robinson-Patman Act was interpreted in Standard
Oil Company v. Federal Trade Commission'" to be in accord
with the main policy of antitrust laws: Free pricing shall
remain the principal weapon of competition. While the Act apparently prohibits discriminations in prices made by a seller
to purchasers in competition with each other, this sanction
109 Cases cited, supra note 106.
1110 American Tobacco Case.
112 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
1

Symposium on Trade Ass'n, 27 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,

127 (1965); Brass, Antitrust Div. Looks at Trade Ass'ns, 30
J.B.A.D.C. 287 (1963); Wilson, Fed. Trade Comm'n Looks
at Trade Ass'ns, 30 J.B.A.D.C. 297 (1963).
113 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
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was held not only to condone actual discrimination but to yield
a burden upon the seller to meet lower competitive prices inasmuch as there exists an inherent necessity of one competitor to meet the price rate of his trade adversary. 1 4 The solicitude for price competition carried over into the published interpretations of Section 13a of Title 15 of the United States
Code, as is manifest in the case of Balian Ice Cream Company
115
v. Arden Farms Company.
To conclude, the import of these decisions is that t h e
Borah-Van Nuys section of the Robinson-Patman Act, and the
Robinson-Patman Act itself, must not be read nor interpreted
to destroy the primary legislative policy which they subserve.
Thus, an "unreasonably low price" may not be read to mean
and include simply a reduced price." 6 It may not be read to
mean a price lower than a competitor's price," 7 nor a price
to which a competitor will not agree," 8 nor a price at which
a competitor is unable to make a profit." 9 Any of these interpretations would result in freezing prices at the level of
mutual competitor consent or at the level at which the weakest competitor was able to derive a reasonable profit. Any
once of them, suffice to say, would largely defeat the principal objective to the antitrust laws and would specifically exclude price from the future field of competition. Together, they
are the very antithesis of antitrust doctrine.
"4

Id.

"5

104 F. Supp. 796, at 800-02 (S.D. Cal. 1952).

116 Bruce's Juices v. Am. Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947); National

Nut Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76, at 82 (N.D. l.
1945).
17 Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., supra note 115,
at 801.
8
1

Id.

"9

Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, at 246 (1951); Ben
Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481, at 486 (10th Cir. 1957)
citing Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F.
Supp. 796, at 801 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See H.R. REP. No. 1422,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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